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1 Introduction
Much recent epistemology concerns the social dimensions of knowledge. While tradi-
tionally epistemology has mainly been concerned with the predicament of the individual
knower, considered in abstraction from his or her community, in reality much of the infor-
mation we have comes not from our own isolated investigations, but instead by trusting
the testimony of others.1 An important task for socially situated knowers, then, is to
identify knowledgeable individuals whose testimony we should seek out and rely on. Nor-
mally this task is straightforward, and doesn’t raise any deep epistemological puzzles.
If my toilet isn’t flushing, I’ll ask a plumber to tell me what’s wrong, and how to fix
it. And if I don’t already know a reliable plumber, there are obvious, unproblematic
strategies I can use to find one.
Sometimes, however, this task is less straightforward. Both descriptive questions—
how do we decide whom to trust?—and normative ones—how should we decide whom
to trust?—can be tricky.2 In this paper, I’ll use the example of climate change to
discuss a partial answer to the descriptive question of how we decide whom to trust:
the cultural cognition thesis, according to which we treat individuals as knowledgeable
For helpful comments and discussion, thanks to Nathan Ballantyne, Tristram McPherson, Elizabeth
Miller, and David Plunkett.
1See, e.g., Coady (1992), Lackey (2008).
2See Goldman (2001) for an instructive treatment of some of the difficulties involved in satisfactorily
answering the latter question. The latter parts of this paper can be seen as an attempt to apply some
of the general lessons Goldman suggests.
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experts on factual questions of political import only insofar as they share our cultural
worldview.3 I’ll go on to ask some normative questions about cultural cognition: should
we think of it as a species of irrationality that must be overcome (or circumvented) if
we are to communicate scientific results effectively, or should we instead think of it as
an inescapable part of rational belief management? If it is irrational, why is that so?
Answering these normative questions will require getting clearer on how and to what
extent cultural cognition contrasts with other, putatively distinct strategies for learning
from testimony, both rational (e.g., Bayesian conditionalization) and irrational (e.g.,
confirmation bias).
Before introducing the cultural cognition thesis, however, I want to head off a poten-
tial worry. Climate change might seem like a poor example to use to explore normative
questions about deference to experts, because the answers can seem boringly, frustrat-
ingly easy. For instance, Elizabeth Anderson (2011, p.153) writes that “information
needed for laypersons to make sound second-order judgments of the trustworthiness of
testifiers about global warming is readily available. The criteria for making such judg-
ments are evident and easy to apply to information on the Web.” While there are
certainly residual social and psychological questions about (1) why global warming is
nevertheless still controversial, at least in the United States, and (2) how to best change
people’s minds about global warming,4 epistemological questions about what we should
take the relevant facts to be in the first place can seem philosophically uninteresting—
akin to questions about how to find a good plumber.
Whether previous worry is apt depends on just what questions about climate change
we’re considering. If the question is just whether anthropogenic global warming (AGW)
is real—whether temperatures are rising, and will continue to rise, due to past and
present human activity—then the worry is on point; not only is this question uncontro-
3Kahan and Braman (2006) introduces the concept of cultural cognition, and much of Kahan’s re-
search since has been related to it.
4See, e.g., Oreskes (2011) and Jost (2015) for some discussion of these social and psychological
questions.
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versial among those who might plausibly belong to the community of relevant experts,
but finding out that it is so is not a difficult matter. On this point, Anderson is per-
suasive. But questions about the magnitude and costs of AGW, as well as questions
about the costs of policy responses to AGW, are more controversial. To take one signif-
icant example, some climate scientists have proposed various measures to mitigate the
effects of AGW, such as releasing sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere, with the aim of
scattering sunlight into space and thereby reducing the amount that reaches and warms
earth.5 Such “geoengineering” proposals have been harshly criticized by environmental
groups, on the grounds that they are likely to have unintended harmful side effects, as
well as to distract political actors from the necessity of reducing carbon emissions.6,7
Concerning the issue of whether geoengineering should be taken seriously as a re-
sponse to AGW, or dismissed as a dangerous distraction, normative questions about
whom to trust are quite tricky. Moreover, as we’ll see, responses to geoengineering pro-
posals provide a nice example of evidence for the cultural cognition thesis. In the next
section I’ll introduce that thesis, as well as discuss its particular bearing on responses to
geoengineering proposals.
5This technique, and more generally any effort aimed at reducing AGW by scattering or reflecting
sunlight, is known as Solar Radiation Management (SRM). Along with Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR),
which aims at removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, it is one of the two main geoengineering
strategies that has been proposed. See Keith (2013) for sympathetic explanation and discussion.
6For example, the ETC Group’s “Hands Off Mother Earth” campaign, which will be discussed later.
I don’t mean to overstate the extent of the controversy—few if any credible voices are calling for geo-
engineering measures as a replacement for reducing emissions, rather than a supplement— they tend to
stress that even in the best case scenarios for political action to reduce emissions temperatures may still
rise quite a good deal, making additional responses worth considering. This is the stance taken by Keith
(2013).
7The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine have recommended that the term
“geoengineering” be replaced with talk of “climate intervention” (2015). While their arguments for this
proposal strike me as cogent, the terminological change hasn’t yet been widely adopted, so I use the
older term to avoid confusion.
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2 Cultural Cognition
The cultural cognition thesis says that individuals’ cultural commitments, including val-
ues, are explanatorily prior to their beliefs about matters of fact. As Kahan and Braman
(2006) put it, “individuals accept or reject empirical claims about the consequences of
controversial polices based on their vision of a good society.” (p. 148) In general, in-
dividuals will think that the policies that fit naturally into their cultural worldviews
have independently good consequences.8 For example, concerning the death penalty,
those who favor (oppose) it on moral/cultural grounds will go on to believe that it is
effective (ineffective) in deterring crime (Kahan, 1999). Moreover, similar dynamics in-
fluence perceptions of who is a trustworthy expert. To the extent that one’s cultural
commitments fit with a policy of relatively unrestricted gun ownership (gun control),
one will regard as more knowledgable and trustworthy (ignorant and unreliable) putative
“experts”—who are reported to hold that laws permitting “concealed carry” decrease
crime (Kahan et al., 2011). Of relevance to the present paper, Kahan et al. report
similar results concerning perceptions of who is an expert about global warming, and
nuclear power. While the sizes of cultural cognition effects vary from case to case, they
are often substantial.9
8I talk here about “cultural worldviews”, but in most of Kahan’s research he talks more specifically
about individualist/hierarchical worldviews and communitarian/egalitarian ones. The questions used to
measure worldview are available in the appendix of Kahan et al. (2011).
9For instance, Kahan et al. (2011, p. 15) report that:
a plurality of hierarchical individualists (47%) perceived that most expert scientists agree,
a plurality of egalitarian communitarians (47%) that most expert scientists disagree, that
permitting citizens to carry handguns in public reduces crime. Only 10% of hierarchical
individualists perceived that expert scientists disagree with this position, and only 12% of
egalitarian communitarians that they agree with it.
They report similarly large effect sizes concerning perceptions of scientific consensus concerning global
warming:
Solid majorities of egalitarian communitarians perceived that most expert scientists agree
that global warming is occurring (78%) and that it has an anthropogenic source (68%). In
contrast, 56% of hierarchical individualists believe that scientists are divided, and another
25% (as opposed to 2% for egalitarian communitarians) that most expert scientists disagree
that global temperatures are increasing. Likewise, a majority of hierarchical individualists,
55%, believed that most expert scientists are divided on whether humans are causing
global warming, with another 32% perceiving that most expert scientists disagree with this
4
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To get a clearer picture of just what cultural cognition is supposed to be, and how
it is supposed to be distinctive, we can contrast it with the more familiar and general
phenomenon of confirmation bias. Confirmation bias is the tendency to interpret new
information as confirming the beliefs one already has, and to generally conduct one’s
inquiries in ways likely to reinforce, rather than undermine, one’s prior opinions.10 This
isn’t entirely adequate as a characterization of a form of bias, where that is construed
as a pejorative. Some form of methodological conservatism is widely viewed as good
epistemic practice; extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and sometimes
it can be quite appropriate, when faced with phenomena that provide a prima facie
challenge to a firmly entrenched view, to look for ways of interpreting those phenomena
so that they fit with the firmly entrenched view.11 But for present purposes we can
set aside the problem of distinguishing confirmation bias from sensible conservatism; for
now, the question is why, or whether, we should think cultural cognition as anything
other than a tendency to stick to one’s preexisting beliefs, even in the face of apparent
counterevidence.
After all, the subjects in Kahan et al. (2011) likely had prior views about the ef-
fectiveness of gun control, the riskiness of climate change, the safety of nuclear waste
disposal, etc. If you’re faced with evidence that a putative expert rejects the views you
currently hold, but because you’re subject to confirmation bias you’ll try to interpret new
evidence in ways unthreatening to the views you already hold, then deciding that this
“expert” is in fact no such thing is a natural response.12 Kahan (Forthcoming) considers
this response, and takes pains to explain how a cultural cognizer will reason differently
from a victim of confirmation bias. Roughly, the idea is as follows. If confirmation bias
conclusion.
10See (Kahneman, 2011, Part 1, §7) for discussion.
11This idea is often associated with Kuhn (1962).
12See, e.g., Sunstein (2006) who argues that “cultural cognition” is explicable entirely in terms of the
familiar set of phenomena known as “bounded rationality”, of which confirmation bias is a prominent
example. Kahan and Slovic (2006) reply directly, but the more relevant aspect of the response for present
purposes is discussed in Kahan (Forthcoming).
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is what explains the results above, then we should expect it will be very hard to change
people’s minds about, e.g., the riskiness of global warming. Once someone has an opin-
ion, they’ll interpret all further evidence so as to reinforce, or at least not undercut, that
opinion. But if cultural cognition is what’s responsible, then there is a potential path
to persuasion. If the “cultural meaning” of an opinion can be manipulated—if subjects
can be provided with information that makes the opinion seem more congenial to their
cultural worldview than it previously did—then it should be possible to change their
minds.
This is just what Kahan et al. (2015) found evidence for. In their study, subjects
read a “Nature Science” article—presented as a stand-alone publication, but in fact
composed of passages from genuine papers in Nature and Science—describing various
risks associated with climate change, though not advocating for any particular policy re-
sponse to those risks. The general thrust of the piece was bleak; it stated that even with
“strenuous efforts to reduce emissions, atmospheric CO2 concentrations will rise beyond
450 ppm, the level commonly thought to be the maximum safe limit.” Before reading
the article, however, they read one of three different pieces—two framed as responses
to the Nature Science study, and a control piece on an unrelated topic. One response
called for stricter limits on carbon emissions, while the other called for greater investment
in geoengineering research as an alternative to stricter emissions limits. Subjects then
answered various questions about their opinions of the validity of the Nature Science
study, as well as the risks of climate change more generally. Kahan et. al’s hypothesis
was that, depending on subjects’ cultural worldviews—measured on two scales, from
individualist to communitarian and hierarchical to egalitarian—they’d respond to the
experimental manipulation differently. In particular, subjects with hierarchical individ-
ualist worldviews tend to have very different attitudes towards commerce and industry
than subjects with egalitarian communitarian worldviews. Hierarchical individualists
tend to value commerce, and to be skeptical of legal restrictions on commercial activi-
6
Climate Change and Cultural Cognition
ties. Egalitarian communitarians, by contrast, “see commerce and industry as sources of
unjust disparity and symbols of noxious self-seeking, and thus readily credit assertions
that these activities are hazardous and therefore worthy of regulation.”(Kahan et al.,
2015, p.194) To the extent that the cultural meaning of the Nature Science study is that
it favors more limits on commerce and industry—as subjects who read the response piece
advocating for stricter emissions caps will feel—hierarchical individualists should tend
to be suspicious, while egalitarian communitarians should tend to be sympathetic.13
But if hierarchical individualists interpret the cultural meaning of the Nature Science
study differently—which was the purpose of their reading the geoengineering piece—then
they might be less resistant to crediting it. As Kahan et. al. explain:
Researchers who study the impact of narrative on cultural cognition posit
that hierarchical individualists assess information against a story template
that valorizes the use of human ingenuity to overcome seeming natural lim-
its on commerce and industry (Jones 2014; Earle and Cvetkovich 1995). By
featuring how an innovative technology might itself be used to offset the dam-
aging byproducts of technological innovations on the environment, geoengi-
neering, we posited, would evoke this theme and related affective sensibilities.
(p. 200)
Sure enough, after reading the geoengineering response piece, hierarchical individu-
alists were significantly more likely to credit the Nature Science article about risks of
climate change than after reading the emissions limits response piece.14 Perhaps sur-
prisingly, this effect was symmetrical—after reading the geoengineering response piece,
egalitarian communitarians were significantly less likely to credit the Nature Science
article than after reading the emissions limits response piece. All this would be difficult
13Of course, there are also hierarchical communitarians, and egalitarian individualists. Their responses
didn’t contrast as sharply with one another as did those of the hierarchical individualists and egalitarian
communitarians, though.
14Though they still credited the article a lot less than egalitarian communitarians did.
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to explain, Kahan argues, if it were just confirmation bias at work (Forthcoming). Indi-
viduals subject to confirmation bias would form firm opinions about climate change and
would then resist changes to those opinions, whether prompted by additional evidence
of a familiar sort, or exposure to the sorts of response pieces involved in Kahan et. al.’s
study. The fact that exposure to those responses did prompt people to modify their
opinions suggests that confirmation bias isn’t the whole story.
Before moving on, let’s take stock. Part of my aim in summarizing the above research
was to draw attention to a partial answer to the descriptive question of how we decide
whom to trust on controversial matters of political import—we use cultural cognition.
But I also hope it makes salient the trickiness of related normative questions. In partic-
ular, to the extent that (a) there are controversial factual questions about the efficacy
of geoengineering proposals and the danger of their side effects, and (b) our views about
whom to trust on these matters matter are likely shaped by cultural cognition,15 it’s
natural to start asking normative questions about the rationality of cultural cognition.
If we have strong initial reactions to geoengineering proposals—as a non-trivial propor-
tion of the public does when exposed to them (Mercer et al., 2011)—should we distrust
those reactions, once we get evidence that they were likely shaped in this way?16
To shed some light on this question, I’ll start by pushing back on Kahan’s argument
that cultural cognition can be cleanly distinguished from confirmation bias. Having done
that, I’ll go on to argue that, at least in the relevant cases, it’s also hard to distinguish
cultural cognition from from simple Bayesian updating, with certain sorts of priors.
15To be clear, I don’t know of any studies that directly look for relations between cultural world-
views and opinions on geoengineering—Kahan et al. (2015) never directly asks people their opinions on
geoengineering, and while Mercer et al. (2011) provides helpful evidence concerning public opinions on
geoengineering, they don’t look at the relationship between those opinions and the cultural worldviews
that figure in Kahan’s line of research.
16Perhaps, e.g., for reasons of the sort discussed by Ballantyne (2012) and Vavova (2016).
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3 Values or Beliefs?
For reasons already explained, Kahan (Forthcoming) makes a compelling case that cer-
tain form of confirmation bias—a bias towards maintaining one’s opinion about the
validity of studies suggesting serious risks from climate change—cannot explain the phe-
nomena described in Kahan et al. (2015).
But it would be too quick to conclude from this that such phenomena cannot be
explained by any form of confirmation bias. Suppose we think of the subjects as pre-
disposed towards maintaining not their specific beliefs about climate change risks, but
their more general beliefs about cultural groups and trustworthiness. How might this
more general disposition explain the behavior of the subjects in the study? Suppose
hierarchical individualists tend to distrust environmentalists—i.e., they think that envi-
ronmentalists tend to be wrong about the factual issues on which they take distinctive
positions. This distrust will lead them, upon reading about how environmentalists take
climate change risks seriously, to take those risks less seriously. But when reading that
geoengineering advocates take climate change risks seriously, we might naturally expect
the opposite reaction. Geoengineering—especially as presented in the study in Kahan
et al. (2015), with pictures of giant carbon scrubbers being erected in an otherwise pris-
tine wilderness, and futuristic aircraft spraying chemicals into clouds—seems like exactly
the sort of policy that environmentalists would hate. So when hierarchical individual-
ists learn that among those who take climate change seriously are people who are not
culturally associated with environmentalists—indeed, people who propose measures of
the sort environmentalists reject—they get reason to take climate change more seriously
themselves. And the opposite will hold for egalitarian communitarians. Once they learn
that among the people who take climate change seriously are people who would propose
such prima facie anti-environmentalist measures, they take climate change (a bit) less
seriously themselves.
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The crucial point here is that, on the above interpretation, the phenomena are ex-
plained as a consequence of well-entrenched beliefs; values needn’t be playing a funda-
mental cognitive role. Kahan et al. (2015) isn’t the only study to which Kahan (Forth-
coming) appeals to distinguish confirmation bias from cultural cognition. But other
studies are vulnerable to a similar reinterpretive strategy. For example, in Kahan et al.
(2012), in a between-subjects design, subjects saw a video that they were either told was
of an anti-abortion protest outside an abortion clinic, or a protest against the “don’t ask,
don’t tell” policy, outside a campus recruitment center. They were then asked questions
about whether the protesters “blocked” and “screamed in the face” of pedestrians, and
more generally whether the protesters’ conduct was aimed only at persuasion, or instead
intimidation. Subjects’ responses were significantly mediated by their cultural world-
views. E.g., hierarchical individualists were significantly more likely to see “blocking”
when the protest was supposedly outside a military recruitment center than when it was
outside an abortion clinic (83% vs. 62%). Egalitarian communitarians displayed the
opposite pattern, seeing more blocking outside the abortion clinic (56% vs 35%). (p.
29)
Kahan (Forthcoming) argues that these results cannot be explained as the result of
overly sticky beliefs (confirmation bias), because the beliefs in question were an artifact of
the experiment, and didn’t even exist prior to it—before they saw the video, subjects had
no views about the (fictional) protest, or the conduct of the demonstrators therein. But
subjects did, presumably, have general beliefs about behavioral tendencies of members
of cultural groups, which might have influenced the specific beliefs about the protesters
they went on to form. Suppose, plausibly, hierarchical individualists think that anti-
military protesters tend to be unruly and rude, while anti-abortion protesters tend to
be fervent, but respectful. And suppose egalitarian communitarians think that anti-
abortion protesters tend to be heartless and judgmental, while anti-military protesters
tend to be passionate, but peaceful. Then after watching a three and a half minute
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video, we might expect that these standing views would influence subjects’ recollection
and interpretation of ambiguous visual evidence.17 Just how this influence might work is
a complex, and much-studied topic.18 But what matters is that, on this interpretation,
values enter into the picture only in a derivative way; the phenomena are explained by
subjects’ general beliefs about how people with values that differ or align with their own
tend to behave.
I’ve just argued that grounds Kahan (forthcoming) offers to think that the phenom-
ena he and his coauthors have identified cannot be explained by confirmation bias are
inadequate. But in fact, the response is more general—nothing in my response depends
on the idea that the general beliefs that play a role in explaining such phenomena be
biased in some normatively loaded sense. Given an orthodox subjective Bayesian view,
hierarchical individualists might be perfectly rational in harboring a general distrust of
environmentalists, just as cultural egalitarians might be perfectly in trusting them.19
Even given more objective views, at least some of these general beliefs about which
groups are trustworthy might be rational, even if not all will be. Once we think of
these phenomena as potentially explained by straightforward updating on general be-
liefs, rather than by some cognitively distinctive process in which values are usurping
the roles typically reserved for beliefs, should we continue talking about some distinctive
species of “cultural cognition”, and asking questions about its normative status? In the
next section I’ll explore some reasons to think the answer might still be “yes”.
17On the point about ambiguity, there was relatively less polarization on more clear-cut questions such
as whether protesters spat or shoved pedestrians (p. 29).
18In particular, given a strong “cognitive penetrability” thesis, subjects’ background cognitive states,
such as beliefs about who tends to be rude or violent, might directly effect their visual experiences upon
seeing a video like the one in the study. While such theses have been widely endorsed, there are some
strong grounds for skepticism—see Firestone and Scholl (2015). But even skeptics of strong cognitive
penetrability theses grant that background cognitive states often modulate attention, in ways that have
significant influences on perceptual judgments and recollections of those judgments.
19See Howson and Urbach (1996) for a canonical defense of this view.
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4 Cultural Cognition and Coincidence
The core idea of cultural cognition is that it involves values taking some sort of cognitive
priority over beliefs. In the previous section I explored how, in the explanations Kahan
offers, general beliefs could take the place of values, apparently depriving values of any
cognitively distinctive (and potentially suspicious) role to play. In this section, however,
I’ll try to make a case that even if this is right, the sort of general beliefs involved might
nevertheless be an appropriate target of normative criticism, due to a kind of dependence
on values.
To see why, it may help to return to (putative) examples of cultural cognition that
directly involve views about public policy, rather than whom to trust about public policy.
For example, recall how those whose values oppose (favor) the death penalty tend to
believe it lacks (has) a significant deterrent effect, or the analogous relation between
holding values congenial or hostile to gun ownership, and beliefs about consequences of
concealed carry laws.20 These correlations seem (to me at least, and I hope to the reader)
like plausible symptoms of some kind of irrationality; to the extent that I notice such
correlations in my own body of belief, I get worried, and suspect that I’ve succumbed
to some sort of bias. Why should this be? A natural thought is that, to the extent that
this pattern holds quite generally for a subject—that whichever policies she favors on
basic values grounds, she also thinks have independently good consequences—this should
seem, from the subject’s point of view, like a striking, unexplained coincidence. Suppose
the death penalty is both fundamentally unjust, and applied in a racially discriminatory
manner.21 Neither of these properties would plausibly figure, however, in any explanation
of its deterrent effects; if it lacks a significant deterrent effect, the explanation for that
absence won’t have to do with its fundamental injustice, or its racially discriminatory
application.22 So if one believes both that it is fundamentally unjust and applied in a
20On the former, see Kahan (1999). On the latter, see Kahan et al. (2011).
21See, e.g., Baldus et al. (1997).
22This is a bit quick. E.g., if the death penalty is never applied to members of some racial group, and
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discriminatory manner, and that it lacks a deterrent effect, one believes a coincidence.
In the remainder of this section, I’ll argue as follows. First, I’ll offer a (rough) analysis
of the notion of a coincidence. Then, with this analysis in hand, I’ll argue that (1) the
general beliefs that would figure in explaining cultural cognition would typically be beliefs
in coincidences, and (2) there’s an important sense in which beliefs in coincidences are
epistemically suspect.
I’ll take the following as a working analysis of the notion of coincidence: P & Q
is a coincidence if the best explanation of P & Q is just the best explanation of P,
concatenated with the best explanation of Q.23 It’s not particularly important to me
that this capture all cases we’d tend to characterize as coincidences—my aim is just to
be able to identify a target notion of coincidence for which both (1) and (2) above hold.
But I do want to say a bit about why it might seem like a natural analysis, by taking a
paradigm coincidence, and a paradigm non-coincidence, and showing how the analysis
neatly fits them both. First, let’s take a paradigm coincidence. Suppose I run into two
whiskey distillers on the same day. Two versions of the case:
1. They’re in town for independent reasons; one of them is visiting a relative who
just had a child, while the other is here to watch a sporting event.
2. They’re both in town for the American Craft Spirits Association (ACSA) conven-
tion, and I meet them in the convention hotel.24
Case 1 clearly describes a coincidence. The analysis captures this. We can formulate
the target coincidence as a conjunction: I met A, who is a whiskey distiller, and
I met B, who is a whiskey distiller. And the explanation of this conjunction will
this is widely known, then we should expect that it wouldn’t deter crime among members of that group.
23This is very much in the spirit of Owens (1992), who defends the view that for a conjunction to be a
coincidence is for the conjuncts to lack a common cause. While my emphasis is different, it’s quite plau-
sible that when events have a common cause, the best explanation of their conjunction will feature that
common cause, and so will be more concise than a concatenation of their best explanations, individually.
While there are problems with this account—see Lando (2016) for some ingenious counterexamples, as
well as a plausible diagnosis of the problem—it’s close enough for present purposes.
24A true story of my experience at the 2016 central APA.
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just be the concatenation of the explanation of my meeting A, and the explanation of
my meeting B. Case 2 clearly describes a non-coincidence. The analysis captures the
contrast. In case 2, the best explanation of the conjunction won’t concatenate the best
explanations of the conjuncts, since that would involve unnecessary repetition. The
best explanation of the first conjunct overlaps substantially with the best explanation of
the second conjunct—both explanations crucially involve the ACSA convention.25 Since
good explanations aren’t needlessly redundant, the best explanation of the conjunction
would only say once, rather than twice, that the convention was in town.
Why should we be worried about believing coincidences? In general, we shouldn’t.
E.g., if I know there is no ACSA convention in town, or anything else that would tend
to attract distillers, and yet I still meet two distillers on the same day, there needn’t be
anything wrong with believing this to be a coincidence. Nevertheless, there is a special
sort of case in which beliefs in coincidences are epistemically suspect. Suppose a subject
S believes P & Q, and takes this to be a coincidence. But suppose, in addition, that
the conjunction S believes P & S believes Q is itself not a coincidence; that is,
the explanation of why S believes both P & Q is better than what you’d get by just
tacking an explanation of why S believes P onto an explanation of why S believes Q. To
the extent that one suspects one is such a subject, one has reason to suspect one has
succumbed to some form of bias or irrationality.
The preceding was somewhat abstract, so it may help to consider an example. Sup-
pose Don is prejudiced against Armenians, in the sense that he tends to form negative
judgments of individual Armenians he meets. But suppose he doesn’t have any neg-
ative general beliefs about Armenians as a group. So Don believes, e.g., that Georgy
is dishonest and that Houry is incompetent, but doesn’t think there’s any common ex-
planation of these facts—he takes this conjunction to be a coincidence. Nevertheless,
25A more careful analysis would probably focus on degrees of coincidence. The greater the overlap in
the best explanations of the conjuncts, the less coincidental the conjunction. Even case 1 would involve
some overlap, and so wouldn’t be maximally coincidental. But for present purposes, we can harmlessly
treat the notion of coincidence is a binary one, for the sake of simplicity.
14
Climate Change and Cultural Cognition
the fact that he believes both of these things is not a coincidence—the best explanation
for this conjunction is that Don tends to form negative beliefs about Armenians, and
Georgy and Houry are both Armenian.26 The epistemically problematic cases of beliefs
in coincidences, that is, are cases where there’s no common explanation of the (putative)
facts that P and that Q, but there is a common explanation of a subject’s belief in those
facts.
Why should such cases, in general, be symptomatic of irrationality? In general, we
hope that patterns in our beliefs will correspond to patterns in the facts those beliefs
are about. To the extent that they don’t, our beliefs are inappropriately unresponsive
to reality, and will be inaccurate. When we have evidence that patterns in our beliefs
are unrelated to patterns in reality—that the explanations for why we believe what we
do are unrelated to the explanations for why the facts are the way they are—we have
evidence that our beliefs are inaccurate, which should force some kind of reassessment of
those beliefs. It’s hard to extend these sketchy remarks into a fully general rule or test
for irrationality. For instance, the principle that we should only believe those proposi-
tions that play a role in explaining why we have the beliefs we do, is self-defeating.27
But we needn’t endorse any such fully general thesis to think that, for ordinary, non-
foundational, empirical beliefs, it’s some kind of red flag when the best explanation of
the belief is unrelated to the best explanation of the (putative) fact it’s a belief about.
Let’s return to cultural cognition, as we’re now in a position to state more precisely
what sort of epistemological worries it raises. A cultural cognizer believes some nor-
mative claim P, and some descriptive claim Q, such that P & Q, if true, would be a
coincidence.28 But there are available various plausible, non-coincidental explanations
for why she believes both P & Q—perhaps involving wishful thinking, or cognitive dis-
26So by the analysis, an explanation of the conjunction that concatenated the explanations for the
conjuncts would be needlessly repetitive, in that it would mention Don’s prejudice twice.
27See Pust (2001), who attributes similar theses to Gilbert Harman and Alvin Goldman and argues,
convincingly to my mind, that the theses are self-defeating when endorsed in full generality.
28There are also cases where both claims are descriptive, but the paradigm cases will involve normative
and descriptive claims.
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sonance reduction, or other related psychological mechanisms. To the extent that the
cultural cognizer comes to appreciate her situation, some kind of reassessment is called
for—she has evidence that there are patterns in her beliefs that are unrelated to patterns
in reality.
What about when the beliefs at stake aren’t directly about the consequences of public
policies, but instead about whom to trust concerning those consequences? Can this sort
of cultural cognition also be understood as involving belief in potentially suspicious
coincidences? I think it can. The two potentially coincidental sorts of beliefs will be
as follows. First, beliefs to the effect that certain putative experts’ values are the right
(wrong) ones concerning the area of policy in question. Second, beliefs to the effect that
those putative experts are reliable (unreliable) about descriptive questions concerning
the consequences of policies in the relevant area.
I don’t mean to imply that such combinations of belief would always be beliefs in
coincidences. It’s plausible that, in some cases, there will be common explanations of
people’s reliability on evaluative matters, and on factual matters. For example, a capac-
ity for empathy might both enable someone to appreciate certain moral facts (e.g., con-
cerning others’ dignity, entitlement to respect, moral status, etc.), and certain non-moral
facts (e.g., concerning others’ psychological states).29 But such connections shouldn’t be
treated as a default; in the absence of some explanation as to why moral and non-moral
reliability in an area should coincide, we should treat their putative coincidence as, well,
coincidental.30 And insofar as we find ourselves consistently and across domains think-
ing that those with the right values are also the most reliable on descriptive questions,
we should worry that we’ve succumbed to some form of irrationality—we’ll have noticed
29Though see Bloom (2016).
30Street (2006) argues that while there are available good evolutionary explanations of our reliability
on non-moral matters, our reliability on moral matters would be inexplicable, in the absence of a con-
structivist metaethics. And even in the presence of such a metaethics, our reliability on moral matters
receives a very different explanation than our reliability on non-moral matters. I mention her position
not to endorse it, but just to make salient that the task of explaining our reliability on non-moral matters
may look very different from explaining our reliability on moral matters.
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a pattern in our beliefs that doesn’t plausibly match a pattern in reality.
This diagnosis neatly fits some cases of cultural cognition, but other cases are less
obvious, and some don’t fit at all. To see how, it will help to contrast two cases.
Imagine two individuals, both of whom have broadly libertarian values—they oppose
most economic regulations. They also both believe that economic regulations tend
to stifle innovation and to increase poverty—they tend to produce changes that even
non-libertarians would recognize as for the worse. Our first libertarian, however, holds
her position for fundamentally deontological reasons—she believes that, irrespective of
their downstream consequences, economic regulations infringe on people’s rights, and
are intrinsically wrong. Perhaps she was convinced by Nozick (1974). Our second, by
contrast, has purely consequentialist, non-rights-based grounds for her libertarianism.
Now, imagine both of them are confronted with some new proposed regulation. Both of
them think it would be wrong to enact, and both of them think it would have bad con-
sequences. If my earlier claims are right, our first libertarian has grounds for suspicion
about her beliefs. By her lights, the fact that economic regulations are both unjust and
have bad consequences is a pure coincidence. The discussion above suggests that her
beliefs deserve serious scrutiny, even if they may survive it. But by contrast, our second
libertarian needn’t countenance any such suspicious coincidence; while she thinks that
economic regulations are unjust, and that they have bad consequences, the former fact
is fully grounded in the latter. There’s nothing epistemically suspicious here.31 Both
subjects would probably look like cultural cognizers in a social scientific survey; they’d
both assent to general statements like “People who are successful in business have a right
to enjoy their wealth as they see fit,” and “Government regulations are almost always a
waste of everyone’s time and money,”32 and would both also agree to claims about how
particular regulations would likely have undesirable consequences. But these similarities
31I’m setting aside, of course, questions about what the evidence actually suggests concerning conse-
quences of economic regulations.
32These are items from the worldview scales used by Kahan and collaborators. See http://www.sjdm.
org/dmidi/Cultural_Cognition_Worldview_Scales.html.
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conceal crucial epistemological differences.
Does this mean that cultural cognition only raises epistemological worries in cases
where the “values” in question that correlate with beliefs are genuinely values, rather
than relatively general factual beliefs about what sorts of policies have what sorts of
consequences? I don’t think so. Even in the latter case, essentially the same kinds of
worries about suspicious coincidences can arise. An example may help make this clear.
Suppose a political party releases a platform detailing many positions on a wide range
of issues—economic policy, foreign policy, social policy, science policy, etc.. Suppose,
plausibly, that there is no simple rationale that would collectively justify each of these
positions—after all, they’re positions on widely disparate issues. Rather, if they are
each good policies, they are good policies for almost entirely independent reasons. Now
imagine someone who’s always voted for this party, call him “Team Player”. who thinks
that each of the policies in the platform is a good one, in the sense that each policy would
in fact have consequences that are widely recognized as desirable (i.e., even by people
of conflicting worldviews). There is at least the threat of suspicious coincidence here.
Even though each of the beliefs in this case—beliefs about the likely effects of some or
another policy—is strictly factual, their joint truth might look suspiciously coincidental,
by Team Player’s lights. Certainly this will be true if Team Player doesn’t think that
the process by which the party platform was generated was particularly reliable—in that
case, the situation would be like somebody winning the lottery many times in a row:
suspicious. But even if Team Player does think the process by which the party platform
was generated was reliable, that belief might itself look like a belief in a coincidence.
After all, since the party platform concerned so many diverse areas of policy, the party
would have to have reliable methods for discerning facts across unrelated domains, and
would have to reliably pick the policies best supported by those facts across diverse
domains. While this certainly isn’t impossible, it’s the sort of thing that should make
Team Player wonder—how is it that my party so consistently got things right? And to
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the extent that Team Player cannot come up with a good answer here, he should worry
that this pattern in his beliefs—his consistently thinking that his side got things right—
is produced by some kind of bias, rather than an appreciation of a genuine pattern in
reality.
5
How should these general lessons inform our thinking about climate change and geo-
engineering? My aim in this section will be as follows. First, I’ll provide a very brief
summary of the range of opinion on the promises and risks of geoengineering. Then,
I’ll contrast how an unreconstructed cultural cognizer would react to these facts, with
how we should react to them after learning to be skeptical of beliefs formed via cultural
cognition.
While there is a great deal of evidence about opinions—both scientific and lay—
concerning general questions about the existence of anthropogenic global warming, there
is relatively less evidence about the distribution of opinion on geoengineering. Moreover,
in the case of lay opinion, responses differ significantly depending on how questions
are framed—perhaps unsurprisingly, given the relative lack of public familiarity with
geoengineering.33
Both the Royal Society (2009) and the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine (2015) have released reports that provide evidence of some points of sci-
entific consensus. First, geoengineering shouldn’t be seen as an alternative to emissions
reductions—at best, it would be a supplement. Second, no geoengineering proposals are
33Compare the results reported in Mercer et al. (2011), which show a decent amount of support for
geoengineering (or at least, for geoengineering research), with those of the National Survey of American
Public Opinion on Climate Change—the relevant portions of which are summarized by Borick and Rabe
(2012)—which seem to show more skepticism. While the surveys were taken at similar times by similar
populations, the exact questions asked were different. Moreover, Mercer et al. (2011) included informa-
tion explaining the concept of solar radiation management—a particular version of geoengineering—while
the National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change did not.
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well enough understood yet for implementation on a wide scale. Both reports call for
additional research, both scientific—e.g., concerning the feasibility and risks of various
geoengineering proposals—and political—e.g., concerning how geoengineering propos-
als might be agreed upon and subsequently regulated on an international scale. But
even if there is agreement on those points—and there’s some reason to think that even
the call for more research is controversial—it likely conceals a wide range of attitudes,
ranging from the very pessimistic to the cautiously optimistic, about the promise of
geoengineering.34
While no major scientific body endorses either pole of pessimism or optimisim about
geoengineering, other groups have taken much stronger positions, both pro and con.
The American Enterprise Institute (AEI)—a conservative think tank— launched a geo-
engineering project. While the AEI doesn’t adopt official positions on policy issues,
it’s fair to say that the project was generally pro-geoengineering. For example, it was
co-directed by Lee Lane, who testified before the House Select Committee for Energy
Independence and Global Warming that “research to learn more about geoengineering’s
potential and limitations might be one of the very best ways of hedging against the
larger risks and uncertainties that surround climate policy.” (2008) On the other side,
the Action Group on Erosion, Technology, and Concentration (more commonly known
as the “ETC Group”) has launched an anti-geoengineering campaign called Hands Off
Mother Earth (HOME), opposing not only full-scale deployment, but also preliminary
testing of any geoengineering technologies.35
What will a cultural cognizer, upon learning the above, think about geoengineering?
34I don’t know of any large scale survey of scientific opinion on geoengineering, though in 2009 the
UK’s Independent conducted a poll of 80 leading scientists, finding that 54% agreed with the need for
a geoengineering-based “plan B” in case efforts to reduce emissions fail, while 35% disagreed, and 11%
said they didn’t know whether such a plan was necessary (Green and Connor, 2009). See the online
debate between Keith and Hulme (2013) for representatives of these two poles.
35I don’t mean to imply that environmental groups have spoken with one voice. See the website below
for a summary of the positions of the Environmental Defense Fund and those of other groups; the ETC
group’s opposition is the strongest, with the Environmental Defense Fund and many other groups call-
ing for small-scale experimentation with geoengineering techniques: https://www.edf.org/climate/our-
position-geoengineering.
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One possibility, suggested by the results reported in Kahan et al. (2015), is that geo-
engineering all on its own—independent of facts about the distribution of opinion about
it—would trigger cultural associations, depending on one’s values either positive or nega-
tive. But even in the absence of such associations, knowing that institutions like the AEI
and the ETC group stand on opposite sides of the issue would likely be enough to im-
bue it with a cultural valence, either positive or negative depending on one’s antecedent
sympathies and antipathies for conservative pro-business groups and environmentalist
groups. Hierarchical individualists, then, seeing that groups they trust (because of their
generally free market stance) support geoengineering, and that groups they distrust (be-
cause of support for limits on free enterprise and entrepreneurial culture) oppose it,
will tend to support geoengineering. Faced with disagreement among leading scientists,
they’ll likely modify their opinions of which scientists are really experts—taking those
optimistic about geoengineering to be more qualified and knowledgable than those pes-
simistic. And we would expert a symmetrical and opposite reaction from egalitarian
communitarians, resulting in their discrediting those scientists who are optimistic about
geoengineering, and trusting those more skeptical.36
But what if we’ve learned to distrust cultural cognition? Whatever our values, we’ll
be hesitant to treat those who share (reject) our values as thereby reliable (anti-reliable)
on factual questions. So, whether we share the values of the AEI or not, we won’t think
that they are thereby reliable or anti-reliable on questions about the magnitude of the
risks and benefits of geoengineering. Likewise with the ETC group. Moreover, since nei-
ther the AEI nor the ETC group have many expert climate scientists as members—where
expertise is judged on the largely culturally neutral grounds of the sort discussed by An-
derson (2011), involving things like advanced degrees, publication in leading journals,
membership in honorary scientific societies, and the like—we won’t take their positions
to have a great deal of evidential weight concerning factual questions about the risks
36This would be the same dynamic as the one reported in Kahan et al. (2011).
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and promises of geoengineering proposals.
We will take the reports like that of the Royal Society and the National Academy of
Sciences very seriously. But as already discussed, both reports are quite cautious, and
neither endorses a strong position on geoengineering—either optimistic or pessimistic—
that we might adopt as our own. While the reports of those two bodies likely reflect
internal disagreement among their members, unlike the unreconstructed cultural cognizer
we’ll lack anything we recognize as good grounds for deciding, among those members,
which ones are more reliable and trustworthy than others; we won’t be able to identify
the more optimistic or pessimistic members as the genuine experts. So we’ll likely end
up quite uncertain about the risks and rewards of geoengineering—hoping for more
research, but uncertain which (if any) geoengineering proposals will be advisable once
such research is conducted.
This isn’t to say that we’ll regard the cultural associations of geoengineering as com-
pletely irrelevant to questions about its risks. Insofar as a potential partial explanation
for the AEI’s support for geoengineering is that they hope it will undermine support
for strict emissions limits, and insofar as we agree with the aforementioned reports that
strict emissions limits are necessary (regardless of whether geoengineering is or is not
pursued), we may acknowledge a political risk of geoengineering to which its cultural
associations are relevant. But we shouldn’t be confident about the magnitude of this
political risk. Recall the results from Kahan et al. (2015), in which hierarchical indi-
vidualists were less skeptical about research warning of harms from AGW after reading
about geoengineering. It’s entirely possible that widespread discussion of geoengineer-
ing might increase support for strict emissions limits, by undermining the sense among
AGW skeptics that climate change is a “hoax” cooked up merely to motivate such lim-
its. Absent further similar research, confidence about whether geoengineering research
would distract from political action on emissions is unwarranted.
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6 Conclusion
My aim in this essay has been to explore the epistemological implications of a psycho-
logical thesis about how we decide whom to trust concerning matters of cultural and
political significance. While I’ve used the examples of climate change and geoengineering
to frame my discussion, the lessons are, I hope, much broader.
Much has been written recently on the epistemology of disagreement.37 While a
good deal of the discussion has focused on disagreement between “epistemic peers”—
roughly, people in an equally good position to get at the truth on some matter—there’s
something a bit odd about this.38 After all, in many of the most pressing, real-life
cases, including that of geoengineering, the disagreement that seems most significant
is disagreement between our epistemic superiors. And whatever the plausibility of the
idea that some kind of agnosticism or conciliatory response is called for when you find
yourself disagreeing with your epistemic peer, it’s significantly more plausible that such
responses are called for when you find your epistemic superiors disagreeing with each
other.
But just how common should we think it is that, on descriptive questions about
the likely consequences of public policy, there is little consensus among our epistemic
superiors?39 How we answer this question will likely depend on whether we’re com-
fortable using cultural cognition to decide who counts as an expert. If we’re unrecon-
structed cultural cognizers, we’ll find relatively more agreement among those we take to
be experts—because we will withhold the status of “expert” from those who don’t share
our values—and we’ll therefore have an easier time identifying and deferring to a robust
expert consensus. But if we’re skeptical about cultural cognition and manage to stop
37For a sampling, see the papers collected in Feldman and Warfield (2010) and Lackey and Christensen
(2013).
38This isn’t to say that all of the literature focuses on peer disagreement. See, e.g., Goldman (2001),
Frances (2010), Ballantyne (2014) for some examples of papers broadly in the disagreement literature,
but which focus on the challenge posed by disagreement from epistemic superiors.
39See the discussion of “spinelessness” in Elga (2007) to get a sense for some of the complexities here.
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ourselves from using it, the pool of people we count as “experts” will be wider, and the
opinions in that pool will tend to be more varied. We’ll have a harder time making our
way to firm views about the likely consequences of controversial public policies.
Much psychological research suggests that refraining from using cultural cognition
should be difficult and unpleasant; strong opinions about controversial questions of public
policy are markers of group membership and cultural identity, and if we shed them, we
may feel as if we are shedding our very selves. I say, so be it! Where is it written that
rationality should be easy?
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